Ethiopia

A foetus is not a person

As the referendum on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland fast approaches, misinformation and misunderstanding (both deliberate and unintentional) continue to circulate on a massive scale, both on social media platforms and on the forest of posters that line every road and street. The rhetorical weapons used by the Vote No campaign are subtle and powerful. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish fact from mere propaganda, and sound argument from mere rhetoric.

Unsurprisingly, the stakes are high. For those seeking to remove the Eighth Amendment, the basic right to bodily autonomy for women and girls is at stake. For those seeking to maintain the status quo, the power to control, limit and punish women and girls – the basic aims of misogyny – seem to be slipping away. Emotions run high.

One clearly fallacious argumentative strategy used by the Vote No campaign is the use of various “slippery slope” arguments. For example, they argue that if abortion is legalized, then it will lead to terminations of all pregnancies with life limiting conditions; or that if abortion up to 12 weeks is legalized, then there is no guarantee that it won’t be extended to 20 weeks, or to 9 months, or indeed lead to the legalisation of infanticide.

There are a number of problems with these arguments. First, they are empirical, causal arguments: they tell us that if such-and-such state of affairs comes about, then a certain effect will follow. But we should only believe such arguments on the basis of empirical evidence: in particular, only if the relevant kind of state of affairs really has led to the relevant sort of effect in the past. And this evidence simply does not exist: there is no evidence that once the termination of pregnancy under certain circumstances is legalised in a jurisdiction, the effects claimed in the various slippery slope arguments come about.

Moreover, the first example above – that if abortion is legalized, then it will lead to terminations of all pregnancies with life limiting conditions – assumes that the only purpose of abortion is to terminate pregnancies with life limiting conditions. How does termination of pregnancies for reasons other than life limiting conditions fare based on this logic? A foetus’s life limiting conditions is not the sole reason for abortion, and prohibiting abortion in general in order to prevent termination of pregnancies with life limiting conditions makes no sense, since not all terminations are due to life limiting conditions of the foetus.

Furthermore – and this cannot be emphasised enough – abortion happens whether it is legal or not. So criminalizing abortion does not solve any problems – it simply creates more misery and suffering. Criminalizing abortion deprives women and girls of access to safe and legal abortion, and forces them to seek other unsafe means of terminating unwanted pregnancies.

This is an important point: the effect of legalising abortion is not to allow access to abortion where there was none, but rather to make abortion safe.

Finally, voting no to repeal the Eighth Amendment is actively deciding to take away a woman’s right to autonomy over her body. Since legalizing abortion is giving women the right to decide for themselves, neutrality is an expression of satisfaction with the status quo – which currently either forces women either to travel to seek termination, to go through the procedure illegally and unsafely, or forces (using the power of the State) women to carry pregnancy to full term.

Personhood: The Western Christian View vs dialogical views

Arguments about how Irish society’s most vulnerable (working class women, women of colour) are most affected by the lack of safe and legal abortion, or how the criminalizing of abortion in Ireland deprives women of their reproductive rights, are ongoing and familiar within the abortion debate.

What we want to address here is the (mis)conception (which is the basis of some anti-abortion arguments) that a foetus is a person with a right to life equivalent to that of a fully-fledged adult. This follows from the argument that life begins at conception, and that life guarantees personhood. It is a consequence of this line of thinking that as soon as conception occurs, there exist two independent lives (the foetus and the pregnant woman) with equal rights.

Even if we grant that life begins at conception, the idea of equating of life with personhood is a wholly misguided one, which has its roots in the Western Christian notion of a soul. A person, according to this doctrine, is a totally autonomous, self-contained entity that exists independent of others. This view is generally known as “individualistic” and to a large extent attributed to the 17th-century French philosopher, René Descartes. This conception of selfhood is not only problematic but on a closer inspection fails to provide logical support for the argument that a foetus is a person. A foetus is clearly not a totally autonomous and self-sufficient entity, and therefore cannot be granted personhood.

Ubuntu-Empathy-the-New-Paradigm-for-Humanity.jpg

Alternatively, dialogical perspectives of selfhood provide a radically different view of personhood – one that views other people as imperative pillars of the self. According to dialogical perspectives, which stand in sharp contrast to the individualistic notion of personhood, we need and rely on others in order to construct and sustain our sense of self. We are inextricably inseparable from those around us, and continually develop and change through intersubjective interaction with others. Our self-knowledge comes from others and continually develops through our daily intersubjective interactions with others and our environment. As the Russian intellectual Mikhail Bakhtin put it:

“Within my own consciousness, my “I” has no beginning and no end. The only way I know of my birth is through accounts I have of it from others; and I shall never know my death, because my “self” will be alive only so long as I have consciousness – what is called my death will not be known by me, but once again by others. While the birth and death of others appear to be irreversibly real.”

Without others, the very core of our existence is threatened and solitary confinement is a grim and harrowing example of this. With the view of a person as a process (rather than an entity) continually developing and changing and interdependent with others, we might then grant a foetus some status of personhood but one that is not on a par with a fully-fledged adult and, furthermore, one that is entirely dependent on others (the pregnant woman or girl to be specific) for its existence and identity.

The idea of a continually changing self (which is dependent on others for its existence) can be troubling, especially since it seems to remove the apparent total autonomy that we typically take for granted, especially within individualistic cultures.

In non-individualistic cultures – where others are seen as pivotal constituents of the self, communal values are prior to individual ones, and we are before I am (or as the Kenyan-born philosopher John Mbiti put it ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’) – the collective comes before the individual. Responsibility, for example, is distributed among every member of the community, and not something that is left up to individual parents.

In Ethiopia, for example, where I grew up, the manifestation of the sentiment ‘the collective before the individual’ can be seen in the values placed around abortion and child-rearing. While less emphasis is put on the status of the foetus (and the decision mainly left up to the grown adult – the pregnant woman or girl –  who is not equated with a foetus) more emphasis is put on the responsibility of each member of the community in raising a child. If, for example, an adult sees a school child skipping school, responsibility to advise that child and send them back to school is assumed. Members of that community are active participants in the upbringing of all children. This is in stark contrast to more individualistic cultures, where people make it their business to monitor pregnant bodies during pregnancy and (in the Irish case) force women or girls to carry pregnancy to full term, but take little or no responsibility for a baby when it has been born.

Coming back our point about abortion and the implication of the idea of personhood as a process that continually develops with complete dependence on others (gradually becoming less dependent) is that the foetus, being the early stage of the process, in not a person similar to that of a fully-fledged adult.

The response that is often raised by the anti-abortionists to this is that “when does a foetus become a person?”, “at what point does transformation from foetus to a person occur?”

This unfortunately is an ill-framed and irrelevant question, philosophically speaking. Personhood is a process that develops over time through intersubjective dialogical relationships with others. Not an all-or-nothing entity that either exists or doesn’t. Not something you have or don’t have. Looking for a specific time when a foetus becomes a person is therefore misguided.

The anti-abortion argument that a foetus has a right to life in the same sense that a pregnant woman or girl has then lies on philosophically erroneous conceptions of personhood. Given that personhood is a process of continual development that is sustained in interaction with others, it is a mistake to think that the foetus (which is considerably less developed and immensely dependent on the pregnant women) is a person in the same way – and to the same degree – that the pregnant woman or girl is.

This blogpost is co-written by Abeba Birhane, Cognitive Science PhD candidate at University College Dublin and Dr. Daniel Deasy, Lecturer in Philosophy at University College Dublin.

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ክርስትና እና እንስታዊነት ሆድና ጀርባ በሲራክ ተመስገን

የእንስታዊነት (Feminism) እንቅስቃሴ በመሰረታዊነት ሴቷን ከወንዱ እኩል በኢኮኖሚ፣ በማህበራዊ እና በፖለቲካው መስክ ተሳታፊ እንድትሆን ማስቻል ነው። ሴቷ በፆታዋ ብቻ የሚደርስባትን መገፋት ለማስቀረት መንቀሳቀስ ነው። የእዚህ መገፋት እና አባታዊ ስርዓት በአለም ላይ መዘርጋት ክርስትና ትልቅ አስተዋፅኦ አለው ብዬ አምናለሁ። ለእዚህም ነው ብዕሬን ያነሳሁት። እንግሊዛዊው የባይዎሎጅ ሊቅ ሪቻርድ ዳውኪንስ ብዙ በተነገረለት ‘The God Delusion’ በተባለው ድንቅ መጽሀፉ ላይ የብሉይ ኪዳኑን አምላክ እንዲህ ሲል በምሬት ይገልፀዋል፡

“The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully”

ፕሮፌሰር ዳውኪንስ ይሄን ሲል ግን እንዲሁ በባዶው አይደለም፤ ለእያንዳንዱ ስያሜው ከብሉይ ኪዳን መጻህፍት ጥቅስ እያጣቀሰ እንጅ፡፡ እኔም ‹‹ይሄንን ኢ–ሰብዓዊ የሆነን አካል በአምላክነት የተቀበለ ሰው ስለ መብት ሊያወራ አይገባም ›› የምለውም በመጽሃፉ የተጠቀሰው ባህርይ እጅግ ከሰብዓዊነት የራቀ በመሆኑ ነው፡፡። በዚህ ርዕስ የማነሳው የሴቶች መብት እና የእንስታዊነት (Feminism) ጉዳይም የመጽሐፉ ዋነኛ ተጠቂ ናቸው፡፡ በመጽሐፍ ቅዱስ ሴቶች ከብሉይ ኪዳን እስከ አዲስ ኪዳን ድረስ ሴቶች ተጨቋኝ ሆነው የቀረቡበት ጥራዝ ነው። አብነት እየጠቃቀስኩ ላስረዳ፡፡

የብሉይ ሴቶች

በብሉይ በእግዚአብሔር ተወዳጅ ከሆኑ ነገስታት አንዱ ንጉስ ዳዊት ነው። ይህ ሰዉ ወሲብ በጣም ይወድ ነበረ። ብዙም ዕቁባቶች ነበሩት። ሴቶችንም እንደግል ንብረቱ ቆጥሮ በአንድ ቤት ዘግቶ፣ ከማንም ሳይገናኙ እንዲሞቱ የማድረግ ስልጣን ነበረው ዳዊት (2ኛ ሳሙኤል 20:3)፡፡ በአመት ሶስት ጊዜ በሚደረገው የቂጣ በዓል፣ የመኸር በዓል እና የመክተቻ በአል ወቅት በእግዝአብሔር ፊት ለዕይታ የሚቀርቡት ወንዶች ብቻም ነበሩ (ዘጸአት፣ 23:14–17)፡፡ በሙሴዎ ዓለም የተፈጥሮ ኡደቶች (ወሊድም ሆነ የወር አበባ) ለሴት ልጅ የመርከስ ምልክት ነው። እንደዚህም ሆኖ ወንድ ከወለደች 7 ቀን የረከሰች ነች። በአስገራሚ ሁኔታ ሴት ከወለደች ዕጥፍ ቀን የረከሰች ነች መባሏ ነው (ዘሌዋውያን 12: 1–5)፡፡እግዜሩ ለሰው ልጆች ዋጋ ማውጣቱ ሲገርም ሴቶች ከወንዶች ያነሰ ዋጋ ያለቸው መሆኑ ይበልጥ ያስቃል። በብሉዩ ዓለም ከአምስት አመት ሴት ልጅ ይልቅ የአንድ ወር ወንድ ህፃን በዋጋ ይበልጣል (ዘሌዋውያን 27: 1–7)፡፡ ይባስ ብሎም ሙሴ በአምላኩ ሕዝቡን እንዲቆጥር ሲታዘዝ ሴቶች እንደሰው አይቆጠሩም ነበረ (ዘኁልቆ 3:15)፡፡ በዚህ አያበቃም እግዚአብሔር ለሙሴ በሰጠው ህግ መሰረት አንድ ሰው ቢሞት ወንዶች ልጆቹ ብቻ የንብረት ወራሾች ይሆናሉ። ሴቶች ልጆች ወራሾች የሚሆኑት ሟች ወንድ ልጆች ከሌሉት ብቻ ነው (ዘኁልቆ 27:8–11)፡፡ ድንግልና ሳይኖራት ያገባች ሴት በድንጋይ ተወግራ እንድትሞት ‹የእግዚአብሔር ህግ› ያዛል (ዘዳግም22:13–21)። በተቃራኒው ወንድ ድንግልና ከሌለው ይቀጣ የሚል ህግ ግን የለም። በአጠቃላይ የብሉይ ኪዳን ዘመን ተብሎ በሚታወቀው ጊዜ ሴት እቃ ( ) ነች እንጅ ሰው አልነበረችም፡፡ አዲስ ኪዳኑስ ምን ይላል;

ሴቶች በአዲስ ኪዳን

ከብሉይ ኪዳኑ የጭካኔ ዘመን አንፃር እየሱስ ክርስቶስ አብዮተኛ ነበረ ማለት ይቻላል። በአይሁዳውያን ዘንድ ሴቶችን ዝቅዝቅ የማድረግ ባህልን ሲጠቀም አይታይም። ሴቶችንም ያስተምርም ነበረ። በተዘዋወረባቸው ቦታዎችም ሁሉ በቋሚነት አብረውት ይከተለት ነበረ። እንደ ወንዶቹ ይፈውሳቸውም ምሳሌ ያደርጋቸዋልም። ይልቁኑ የክርትና መሰረት ነው ተብሎ ከሚነገርለት ከቅዱስ ጳውሎስ አስተምህሮ ነው አዲስ ኪዳኑ በሴቶች ላይ ሲጨክን የሚታየው፡፡ ጳውሎስ በ1ኛ ቆሮንቶስ 11:3 ላይ «ነገር ግን የወንድ ሁሉ ራስ ክርስቶስ፣ የሴትም ራስ ወንድ፣ የክርስቶስም ራስ እግዚአብሔር እንደሆነ ልታውቁ እወዳለሁ» ብሎ ሴትን በደረጃ ከወንዱ አውርዶ ያስቀምጣታል፡፡ አልፎም ለሴት ልጅ የፀጉር አቆራረጥ ህግ ያፀድቃል። ሴትም ለወንድ ሲባል የተፈጠረች እንደሆነ በግልፅ እና በጉልህ ይናገራል። ሚስቶች የባሎቻቸው ባሪያ እንደሆኑ እና ያለምንም ማመንታት ለባሎቻቸው እንዲገዙ ደንግጓል (ኤፌሶን 5:22–23)፡፡ ሴቶች ህዝብ በተሰበሰበበት ቦታ መናገር አይፈቀድላቸውም። ማወቅ የፈለጉት ነገር እንኳን ቢኖር በቤታቸው ባሎቻቸውን እንዲጠይቁ ነው እግዜሩ የሚያዘውይመክራል ጳውሎስ (1ኛ ቆሮንቶስ 14:34–36)፡፡ ሴቶች እንዲያስተምሩ አይፈቀድላቸውም። በወንድ ላይም መሰልጠን አይችሉም (1ኛ ጢሞቴዎስ 2:11–15)፤ በማለትም ‹ወንድ ወደ ችሎት፤ ሴት ወደ ማጀትን›› ጳውሎስ ይሰብከናል፡፡ ሲያጠቃልልም ሴቶች ደካሞች መሆናቸው በ1ኛ ጴጥሮስ 3:7 ላይ ይነግረናል ቅዱስ ጳውሎስ፡፡ እዚህ ላይ ነው ጥያቄው፡፡ ይሄን የመሰለ ሴቶችን እንደሰው እንኳን ለመቁጥር የሚግደረደር የጭቆና መሳሪያ ተይዞ ስለ ሴቶች መብት ማውራት እንዴት ይቻላል? መብትስ ምንድን ነው? ራስን መቃረን ደሞ በሽታ ነው። ይህን የሃይማኖት የጭቆና ህግጋት እና ትዕዛዝ አውልቀው ሳይጥሉ ‹እንስታዊት ነኝ› ማለት ለእኔ ለእንቅስቃሴው ስድብ ነው። እነደጳውሎስ ምክር ስጥ ብባልም እንደዚህ የመጽሃፉ አማኒያን ራሳቸው ‹የሴት መብት ተከራካሪ› ብለው የሚጠሩ ሰዎች ከእንስታዊነት እንቅስቃሴ ላይ እጃቸውን ቢያነሱ ሸጋ ነው ብይ ነኝ፡፡ “You can’t have your cake and eat it” እንዲሉ፤ ወይ ሽልጦውን ወይ ሆዳችንን ነው ጥያቄው፡፡ ለነገሩ እንደ ኤልዛቤት ስታንተን ያሉ ሴቶች ‘The Woman’s Bible’ ብለው ማሻሻያ ለማድረግ መነሳታቸው፤ የዚሁ የመጽሃፉ ጨቋኝነት ቢያማራቸው አይደለምን?

 

The thorny issue

I recently attended the launch of a report: “Afrophobia in Ireland: Racism against people of African descent” in the Mansion House, Dublin where Dr. Lucy Michael presented her research findings on racism in Ireland. The report findings revealed the unpleasant racist encounters and discrimination that people of African descent experience in Ireland. The report indicated that the urgency for action is vital. During this event, many Africans living in Ireland spoke of their experience of racism. This was one of the first such events that I have attended where racism and issues surround it were discussed openly in a manner that places the experience of people at the centre. In any case, what caught my attention was the quantification of racist incidents. 

“I have encountered 17 incidents of racism in the last 9 years”, one attendee elaborated. It is difficult not to empathize with this individual’s experience of racism. However, I cannot help but wonder what exactly was being counted as an incident of racism. Is it legitimate to call it racism if one’s questions/inputs are not taken seriously during a meeting/classroom while those same questions/inputs are received with great enthusiasm when made by someone else? What if the person is not given a chance to speak at all? Does the fact that they were ignored imply that their inputs are regarded as not worthy of everyone else’s time and hence an incident of racism? Can the way (unfriendly look, disparaging tone, for example) one is spoken to be identified as a racist incident? How about being looked down on or seen as weird or unusual for the way they approach certain issues or the kind of food they eat? Is it an incident of racism if an African descent fails to get hired despite his/her skills and experiences being well suited for the position and better qualified than his/her non-African descent counterparts?

It was noted by one of the attendees during the event that for those of African descent who have been living in Ireland for most of their lives and regard themselves as Irish, comments such as “where are you from?” or “do you like it here?” have the connotation that regardless of one’s effort to integrate and see themselves as Irish they may never fully belong to the society and that they will be seen as an outsider. Such comments are often well intentioned and people do not see them as incidents of racism (if racist at all). Should the fact that they are well intentioned matter? How about the kind of person such comments come from? Is it as a racist incident if one’s experiences are discarded as unusual and weird by a colleague compared to when such comments comes from a complete stranger? Does it have the same effect if that complete stranger is well educated/regarded compared to an uneducated young person on the street?

There was consensus among the panellists and attendees during the launch of the report that there has been report after report with similar findings, and that the time for action is now. There is an urgent need for legislation against hate crimes. Surely, this is a logical and positive move. If nothing else, I think it will heighten awareness that racism is an issue in Ireland. However, racism is not always explicit. In fact it could be argued that this type of implicit racism is more dangerous than the more explicit one where no interpretations of actions or behaviours are necessary. Implicit racism has the potential to inflict self-doubt, especially when racist comments/acts (knowingly or unknowingly) come from those held in high regard. It has the potential to make the person question whether it really is a racist remark or his/her incompetence. This not only questions the legitimacy of one’s experience, it also invalidates it.

I don’t have the answers to the questions raised above and I am highly skeptical of any attempts to provide a simple answer to this very fuzzy and complex matter of what exactly counts as a racist incident. Accounting for such issues in relation to drafting hate crime legislation is bound to be extremely tricky, if at all possible. I do however believe that the better we are aware of the subtle and different forms that racism can take, the better positioned we are to recognize and possibly reduce its occurrence.